The envisaged EU enlargements will lead to a redirection of Structural and Cohesion Funds expenditures from current to new EUmembers. This redistribution of funds makes the accession countries even more attractive as a location of FDI. Using a logistic regressions approach, this paper shows that a hypothetical reallocation of Structural Funds as envisaged by Agenda 2000 leads to a redistribution of FDI by approximately 5 − 7 percentage points from the current EU members to the accession countries (2004 scenario) and by about 7− 9 percentage points (2007 scenario), respectively.
Introduction
The fifth and largest enlargement of the EU by ten countries will take place states. By preserving current overall expenditure levels in the enlarged EU, the redistribution of SCF aims at promoting the catching up process of the ten new members -eight of which are Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) -and to close the still considerable gaps in infrastructure and capital endowments as a legacy of these formerly planned economies. This redistribution of funds is expected to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) into the accession countries in relative terms at the expense of FDI into the current EU member states. The aim of this paper is to quantify the degree of possible FDI shifts from the old to the new EU member states.
The reallocation of SCF should not only affect the inward FDI position of incumbent EU countries in absolute terms, but also its distribution between the incumbent and the entrant countries. The theory of horizontal MNEs suggests that SCF expenditures may reduce the plant set-up costs and, in this way, change the proximity-concentration trade-off in favor of MNE activity (Breuss et al., 2001 ). On the other hand, they may also improve the infrastructure of a country part of which form its transportation networks.
The latter effect reduces transportation costs and favours trade rather than FDI. Hence, the overall impact of the Structural Funds on the allocation of FDI remains an empirical question, which is best analyzed in a logistic re- main results do not depend on these projections. Rather, we obtain a consistent and robust estimate of the corresponding share-multiplier on which any other projection could be based.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reports the main features of the Structural Policy Reform in the EU. Section 3 draws on the proximity-concentration trade-off and formulates the most important theoretical hypotheses concerning the impact of SCF expenditures on the distribution of inward FDI, while Section 4 introduces the logistic bilateral FDI regression framework, which accounts for spatial dependence. Section 5 reports the estimation results and Section 6 presents the simulation exercise.
The last section summarizes the main findings. Romania) the redistribution will continue (see Table 4 for details). From the other current EU member states, only Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, the UK, Italy and Denmark will face minor reductions in transfers out of the SCF program of the EU.
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3 Theoretical Background
The effect of structural expenditures on bilateral FDI is best modelled in a general equilibrium framework of trade and multinationals (MNEs). In the model of trade and horizontal multinational firms (Markusen, 1995 (Markusen, , 2002 Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003a) , the formation of MNEs and FDI is favored by low plant set-up costs and high transportation costs. Concentration of production facilities at a single location and exporting is favored by plant economies of scale (e.g., by high foreign plant set-up costs) and by low transportation costs. Structural expenditures change the proximity-concentration trade-off and, thereby, the international allocation of FDI, if they are used to reduce plant set-up costs (see Breuss et al., 2001) . To the extent that these expenditures are used to improve transport infrastructure and to reduce transportation costs, they may also lower FDI in favor of trade.
Horizontal MNE models suggest two important size-related determinants of FDI (see Markusen et. al., 1996; Markusen and Maskus 1999, 2002) and Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003a , for more details).
In the robustness section, we also apply a specification motivated by the knowledge-capital model of trade and multinational firms, which accounts for the emergence of both horizontal and vertical MNEs (see Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003b; Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Maskus, 2002) . We follow Markusen and Maskus (2002) and introduce an interaction term between the high-skilled to low skilled ratio with the size variables. In this way, it is possible to account for the different influence of size and endowment differences for horizontal and vertical MNE activity. Similar to the horizontal model, a reduction of foreign plant set-up costs, e.g., due to SCF expenditures, enables a country to attract more FDI.
A Logistic Bilateral FDI Regression Model
According to the theoretical arguments, we set up a logistic regression model, which accounts for the impact of SCF expenditures on the distribution of each home country's bilateral stocks of outward FDI. 2 We also allow for distance related neighborhood effects, by introducing spatial lags in the endogenous FDI variable, in the exogenous SCF variable, and in the error term Prucha, 1998, 1999) . In this way, we can test, whether SCF expenditures exert external effects on neighboring countries, and whether the decision to undertake FDI in one country simultaneously influences the decision to directly invest in other (surrounding) host economies. There are arguments 2 Compare Belderbos (1992) for a similar approach in another context.
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for both negative and positive neighborhood effects. Negative effects would occur, if SCF expenditures in one country lead to a loss of FDI in other countries, and even more so, the smaller the distance to these countries.
Forward and backward linkages across neighboring countries, on the other hand, would imply a positive effect of spatially lagged FDI. If domestic SCF expenditures spill over to regions in neighboring countries, so that they also become more attractive for FDI as well, we would expect a positive parameter of spatially lagged SCF expenditures.
We envisage a FDI sending country i = 1, ..., N, which allocates its foreign direct investment stocks to current and future EU host countries j = 1, ..., J at time t = 1, ..., T . Hence, we look at a 'typical' OECD country and the allocation of its outward FDI stocks among the EU15 and the CEEC, disregarding other alternative investment possibilities. For reasons of data availability, we take Spain as the base host country and define the right hand side
For each exporter i at time t, the model reads
For each it, all variables are J-vectors, and W is a J × J spatial, row-normalized weighting matrix. We choose distance as the spatial weight, so that the typical off-diagonal element
, k 6 = j and w jj = 0. Z µ i is a J × J design matrix for fixed bilateral specific effects µ i , and Z λ is a J × 1 of ones to 9 capture the fixed time effects λ t .
F DI itj denotes the log of country i's real stock of outward FDI held in country j in year t. s tj is the host country's SCF expenditure to GDP ratio, G itj is the log of the bilateral sum of real GDP, S itj denotes the log of the bilateral similarity index in terms of real GDP with log(0) ≤ S ijt ≤ log(0.5) (see Helpman, 1987) . k itj represents the bilateral difference in the logs of the physical capital to low-skilled labor ratio and h itj is the bilateral difference in the logs of the high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio. Transportation costs are approximated by the log of the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio derived from trade statistics (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2001) . µ ij capture all unobserved influences, which are constant over time (distance, language, border, etc.), and λ t those common to all country pairs (e.g., common cycle effects). Like the other explanatory variables, these dummies are defined relative to the base (Spain). Keller, 2000) . We start the calculation in 1978, i.e., eight years earlier as the first year in the estimation period, to give lower weight to possibly mismeasured initial stock values:
where K t denotes the real capital stock and I t is gross fixed capital formation.
In line with the bulk of the literature, we assume a constant and identical depreciation rate of 7 percent, so that the real capital stocks in the other years are given by
The difference in the real stock of capital to low-skilled labor ratio (k) uses employment times the share of people with less than secondary school enrolment as a proxy of the low-skilled labor force. We measure h by the secondary to primary school enrolment figures' ratio.
The panel covers outward FDI from a large set of OECD countries into the EU15 and the Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1986 to 1997, and it is unbalanced. Altogether, we can exploit information from 1022 observations in the regression analysis, covering 168 bilateral relations.
We estimate (1) using the GMM-estimator proposed by Prucha (1998, 1999) , which is computationally much less demanding than maximum likelihood estimation (Anselin, 1988) . Since we have a panel of N home countries and T periods, there are NT cross-sections of host countries, which are spatially correlated. Table 2 presents the estimation results of the preferred specification. Equation (3) refers to the full spatial model, accounting for all three types of spatial correlations, Equation (2) restricts the spatial autocorrelation of the error term to zero, while Equation (1) only considers spatial dependence of SCF expenditures.
> Table 2 <
All three versions of the preferred model in Table 2 fit well, and the parameter estimates are relatively similar. Since the Moran I test (Kelejian and Prucha, 2001 ) rejects the hypothesis of zero spatial correlation of the error term, we base our inference on Equation (3). We find a significant pos- at conventional levels. There is not enough variation left to estimate these parameters precisely. Especially, this holds true for the size related controls (G, S), 4 the bilateral difference in the high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio (h) as well as transportation costs (t). There is, however, enough time variation in both capital stock and SCF expenditures data. The latter is partly due to variation in the degree of exploitation of the available SCF.
> Table 3 < we run four Jackknife exercises (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1998) , to identify the most influential country pair relations for the relevant SCF expenditure coefficients (#4-#7).
In the first two experiments, the SCF expenditure coefficients turn out robust. They are considerably lower in the Markusen and Maskus (2002) specification. However, in the latter the two additional interaction terms are insignificant, so that it is inferior to the preferred Equation (3) of Table 2 in our application. Also in the Jackknife exercises, the parameters are quite robust. Hence, we conclude that the parameters of interest are sufficiently robust to proceed with the simulation exercise.
6 Simulating the FDI Redistribution in Europe after EU Enlargement
With the results of Equation (3) to the two scenarios and derive the implied counterfactual distributions of the real stocks of outward FDI in this base period. Consequently, the results are widely independent of the overall volume (rather than the distribution) of SCF expenditures and also of the remaining variables. The significance levels of the projections are based on Monte Carlo simulations (see the Appendix).
The results of the simulation analysis are presented in Table 4 . Note, almost all estimates are significant in the sense that zero is not included in the 1% − 99% interval (***) or in the 5% − 95% interval (**), respectively. Accordingly, a country like the United Kingdom loses FDI shares for three reasons. First, their own SCF expenditures to GDP ratio gets lower. Second, the SCF expenditures in its neighboring countries (Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands) decline. Third, it is a large economy, and such economies react stronger than small ones.
In contrast, a country like Austria gains FDI shares despite its loss in the SCF expenditures to GDP ratio, since in four out of its five neighbors in the sample (Germany and three CEEC: Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic) the SCF to GDP ratio rises. In this case, the external effect of SCF expenditures outweighs the negative own effect. Netherlands the reduction will not be higher than 3 percentage points.
> Table 5 < From Table 3 , we are aware of lower bound estimates of the two SCF expenditure parameters (sensitivity analyses #4 and #6). Therefore, we additionally give the inward FDI stock share changes associated with these parameter estimates in Table 5 . 
Conclusions
According to Agenda 2000, the EU-enlargement leads to a reallocation of Structural and Cohesion Funds. This follows from the consensus to preserve the current overall expenditure levels and to finance the New Structural Operations in the Central and Eastern European economies by a redistribution from the incumbent to the entrant countries. Hence, it can be expected that the direct investments into Europe and the CEEC are reallocated from the former to the latter, independent of whether the overall volume rises or not.
Based on the proximity-concentration trade-off as formulated in the theory of trade and horizontal multinationals, this paper formulates a bilateral 
Appendix
The approximated impact of a ceteris paribus change in the structural funds to GDP ratio of country j, ∆S t , on its own FDI-share in all OECD economies' outward FDI into Europe in year t, F tj , is given by the j − th row of ∆F t ≈ β 1 (I−ρ 1 W) −1 Φ t , where Φ tj is given by F itj (1 − F itj )∆S tj . The external effect on neighbor country k 6 = j is given by the k − th row of ∆F t ≈ ρ 2 (I−ρ 1 W) −1 Φ t W. Here, we only consider the case, where ∆S tk = 0, if
We calculate the predicted values of the basic and the counterfactual model as follows. For convenience, we denote the J × 1 vector of changes in the predictions of O it due to a redistribution of structural funds at time t as 
Now, take the difference of Z before and after the redistribution of structural funds to obtain the J × 1 vector
Using
(8) and (9) are used to derive the counterfactual estimates in Tables 4 and 5 .
Since the standard errors of this non-linear effect cannot be derived analytically, we take the estimated preferred model as the true one and use Monte Carlo simulations to assess the significance of the effects. That means, we randomly draw 10000 coefficients from the multivariate normal with means b ρ 1 , b ρ 2 , and b β 1 and the variance-covariance matrix as estimated in Equation (3) to produce the significance levels in Table 4 . (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Notes: Degrees of freedom in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; # significant at 15%. Notes: Degrees of freedom in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; # significant at 15%. Reference (Table 4) Minimum structural expenditure coeff.
(#4 in Table 3) Minimum spat. lagged struct. expenditure coeff. (#6 in Table 3) Reference (Table 4) Minimum structural expenditure coeff.
(#4 in Table 3) Minimum spat. lagged struct. expenditure coeff. (#6 in Table 3) Notes: p-values are estimated by Monte Carlo Simulations with 10000 repetitions using the respective parameters and variance-covariance matrices. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%.
